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Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, citizenship legislation regulating marriage migration from China and
South East Asia to Taiwan has become one of the most debated public policies in Taiwan
(Friedman 2012, 2010; Liao 2009; Yang and Lee 2009; Kaneko 2009: 23; Tsai and Hsiao
2006: 5). From the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government of 2000–08 to that of
the Kuomintang (KMT) after 2008, each ruling party left its mark on the shaping of the
legislation that safeguards the eligibility of migrant spouses for citizenship rights (Cheng and
Fell 2014: 17–21). While the legislation was evolving, the migrant movement was at the
forefront, campaigning for reforming the restrictive and discriminatory legislation. The
rights-claim movement of migrant spouses is spearheaded by the Alliance for Human Rights
Legislation of Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM) (移民／住人權修法聯盟). Having the
TransAsia Sisters Association, Taiwan (TASAT) (南洋台灣姊妹會), as its original and core
member, AHRLIM is an umbrella alliance forged in 2003 and composed of a large number of
social organizations advocating for the improvement of human rights of women, labour,
migrant spouses and migrant workers (Hsia 2006a: 97, 2006b: 34–5, 2008: 188, 2009b). One
founding member is the Marriage Association of Two Sides of China (MATSC) (中華兩岸
婚姻協調促進會),1 a self-help organization independently established by Chinese migrants
and their Taiwanese spouses in 1998, which later received governmental recognition for their
capacity of advocating for the well-being and rights of marriage migrants from the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in Taiwan. 
It has been well documented that the migrant movement under the leadership of AHRLIM
achieved its goal of improving the legal treatment for South East Asian spouses during the
second DPP presidency. Indeed, the Immigration Act was amended in November 2007
largely in accordance with the demands raised by the movement. The requirement of
financial sufficiency for citizenship eligibility was dropped, the right to work was granted and
the right to reside after the cessation of marriage was partially permitted (Hsia 2006a: 107,
2009b: 371;
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AHRLIM 2013; Liao 2009: 398). After the KMT returned to power in 2008, AHRLIM
continued to lobby on behalf of South East Asian spouses for the amendment of the
Nationality Act and to mobilize the support for equalizing legal treatments for Chinese and
foreign spouses. 
Against the backdrop of the well-studied AHRLIM leadership during the DPP era, however,
what has not been sufficiently examined is the strategic division of labour within the alliance,
which may hold the key to deciphering contrasting interests within the migrant movement.
From the outset of the alliance, it appears opaque as to how individual organizational
members, such as MATSC, contributed to the overall formation of the campaign strategy, the
mobilization of social support and their lobbying for legislative reform. As a result, the
internal dynamics, which made the migrant movement in Taiwan different from other
movements examined in this volume, remains unknown. iven MATSC’s representation of the
huge constituency of marriage migrants from the PRC, a close look at its position and
contributions within the alliance will offer a key to understanding the internal dynamics of
the migrant movement in Taiwan. In this light, this chapter aims at examining the campaign
of AHRLIM after 2008 during the KMT administration, with a focus on the overlapped as
well as divergent interests between MATSC and AHRLIM. This chapter will compare the
changed political environment before and after 2008 and the strategies employed by the
migrant movement as a response to the new political opportunities after 2008. Specifically,
this chapter aims to answer the following questions: (1) how did the change of ruling party in
2008 contribute to the emergence of new political opportunities available to the migrant
movement? (2) How did MATSC and AHRLIM negotiate with the changed political
environment emerging after 2008? (3) What achievements have been attained by AHRLIM as
a whole and MATSC in particular? Underlining MATSC’s somewhat peculiar role and its
strategies within the alliance, this chapter argues that the migrant movement in Taiwan
should be understood not as a unified entity but as a conglomeration of sometimes conflicting
interests. 
Examining the migrant movement: political opportunity theory 
To grasp the complex negotiation between the state and the migrant movement, this chapter
builds on the analytical concept of political opportunity. Political opportunity theory argues
that social movements in general, and their values, strategies, alliances and actions in
particular, are not only a consequence of a lack of representation in social and political
contexts but also related to the operation and development of the political system where they
emerge (Tarrow 1988: 428). Thus, social movements may shape, or be shaped, by the
opportunities and constraints of the socio-political context in which they form and exist.
Moreover, they may engage with politics by asking for inclusion of new issues and concerns
in the political debate (Scott 1991: 24) and, in some cases, they may enter the political and
institutional arena and directly negotiate with the state apparatus (Foweraker 1995: 62)
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Along this line, political opportunity theory sees social movements as a rational action
undertaken by groups of citizens in opposition to institutional actors whose actions have an
impact on the interest of citizens. The focus lies on the dynamic negotiation between the two
sides (Carty 2011: 10–11). To further enhance the dynamism of this negotiation, McAdam
and colleagues (1996) introduce two concepts of mobilizing structures and framing processes
(McAdam et al. 1996: 2). Mobilizing structures refer to the strategies conceived by social
groups allowing drawing resources from various avenues so as to advance social campaigns.
These resources include knowledge, funding, organizational structure, media attention and
political elites’ support (Carty 2011: 9–10). Framing processes refer to the shared cognitive
worldview in which social movements and state institutions mediate their different
interpretations of existing ideology, norms and values. Within this process, not only do social
movements identify new problems and develop their moral appeals; they also envisage their
unique solutions, so that the link between why the movement is campaigned and how it
evolves is synergic (Carty 2011: 12–14). 
Built on political opportunity theory and the concepts of mobilizing structure and framing
process, this chapter will shed light on the following two issues: (1) how the migrant
movement in Taiwan shifted its strategy as a consequence of changed political opportunities
after 2008; and (2) how interests of different migrant groups coexist within the movement as
a consequence of the availability of new political opportunities. 
A dichotomized view of the migrant movement: the known and the unknown 
Current literature on the migrant movement in Taiwan is problematically dominated by a
dichotomy of inside-out and outside-in perspectives. The former is written by involved
activists reporting how the alliance waged its campaign as an aligned movement negotiating
with state structures (Liao 2009; Hsia 2006a, 2008, 2009a, 2010, 2013). The latter prioritizes
the strategies developed by single group members to negotiate with state structures (Tseng et
al. 2013; King 2011). 
As activists who founded AHRLIM, Hsia (2006a, 2008, 2009a, 2010, 2013) and Liao (2009)
take an inside-out perspective, chronicling the progress of the alliance and analysing its
strategy. Prioritizing the perspective of migrant spouses from South East Asia as the main
interest group and active members within the alliance, Hsia assesses their activism,
particularly at the early stage, as being short of critical assets, such as networks, legal
knowledge and language proficiency (Hsia 2010: 104). This evaluation seems to suggest that
they cannot independently a n d autonomously found formal organizations. Nevertheless,
arguing along the lines of the empowerment of the oppressed (Hsia 2006a), contentious
collective politics (Hsia 2008), transversal politics (Hsia 2008), multiple citizenship (Hsia
2009a) and multiculturalism (Hsia 2013), Hsia asserts that, being empowered by their
participation in the movement, migrant spouses have become ‘historical subjects’ capable of
changing social relations. Despite the
4
significance of this scholarship for the understanding of the migrant movement in Taiwan,
these insiders’ accounts are nevertheless given from the stance of the ‘privileged local
activists’ (Hsia 2010: 104) who anchored, orchestrated and choreographed the proceedings of
the alliance. 
It should also be pointed out that these studies draw heavily from the experiences of South
East Asian spouses. Yet these experiences are not entirely identical with those of other
migrant groups, such as marriage migrants from the PRC and labour migrants. In other
words, this inside-out scholarship overlooks the fundamental heterogeneity of interests and
identities within the movement. Thus, these studies do not fully inform how other crucial
group members, such as MATSC, operated inside and outside the movement. The stressed
sisterhood among migrants and the celebrated comradeship among group members induced
by consensus-seeking gloss over divergent or even conflicting interests among member
organizations. These deficiencies flatten the complex heterogeneity, constituted by gender
and ethnicity, within the alliance and, as a result, dismiss the critical diversity of interests that
derive from the heterogeneity within the movement. 
Parallel to this scholarship, there is a separate strand of studies on the campaign mobilized by
marriage migrants from the PRC in cooperation with their Taiwanese partners. In this light,
Chao’s inside-out accounts provide valuable biographical insights into individual migrants’
motivations of participation in the campaign and their interpretations of the impact of the
nationalistic ‘Love Taiwan’ discourse on their personal life (Chao 2006). Yet, viewed from
the theory of political opportunity, Chao’s anthropological observations do not illuminate
how the collective actions of migrant spouses from the PRC and their Taiwanese partners are
possible in the first place. They also do not attend to how PRC marriage migrants’ campaign
fitted into the broad migrant movement spearheaded by AHRLIM. 
Taking an outside-in perspective, and treating PRC migrant spouses’ campaign as contentious
politics, Tseng and colleagues (2013) analyse the political environment where MATSC
campaigns were waged. By scrutinizing the legislation, they demonstrate that the legislation
inaugurated by the KMT and DPP was a reflection of the fluctuating Taiwan–China relations.
Under this overarching political setting, they elaborate other parameters which also affected
the advance of the campaign, including anti-China nationalistic sentiment, the gender bias of
women’s groups towards marriage migration and the legal restrictions on the political rights
of PRC migrant spouses. Although acknowledging that PRC marriage migrants and their
foreign counterparts encountered a socio-political environment that is not entirely identical,
the authors do not delve into how the two groups diverged in terms of their interests, agenda
setting and strategies. Thus, they give an impression that the PRC marriage migrants’ right-
claim campaign was an independent and isolated incident. They also overlook the essential
role played by Taiwanese spouses in the campaign and the complex power relation between
husband and wife, which also shapes the overall outcomes of the movement.
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A juxtaposition of these two strands of literature shows that their strength is also their
weakness. The inside-out accounts focus on AHRLIM and value the universal sisterhood
among migrant spouses but fall short of revealing the internal heterogeneity of interests
within the alliance. The outside-in perspective focuses on PRC marriage migrants’ campaign
and sheds light on opportunities and constraints arising from the socio-political environment,
but it is insensitive to the support rendered by civil society as epitomized by the success of
AHRLIM. Moreover, none of these studies examine transnational factors that are beyond the
national level and, as a result, fail to challenge the inclination, common to the literature on
social movements in Taiwan, that treats domestic politics as the dominant contributing factor
for the evolution of migrant movement in Taiwan. 
Seeing the migrant movement as an alliance of divergent interests and intrinsically
transnational, this chapter aims at addressing the disjointedness embedded in the literature
reviewed above. This chapter regards the migrant movement in Taiwan as a flexible
alignment in which component groups act at times as in a united front and at other times
pursue their own agenda when the environment is ripe for changes favourable to a specific
group. In this vein, AHRLIM is not only a collective actor that makes claims on behalf of all
organizational members and the mass of migrants, but it is also a heterogeneous entity
composed of different identities and interests derived from nationality, ethnicity and gender.
While this chapter explores how the migrant movement led by AHRLIM took advantage of
the new political opportunities rendered by the change of ruling party in 2008, it will also
highlight how MATSC sprang into action in the new socio-political environment and pushed
through their own agenda. 
To enable the outside-in and inside-out perspectives, this chapter utilizes two sets of primary
source materials. First, the Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan was employed as an
archival resource to understand the political dynamics between the movement and their
collaboration with legislators. Recording the interaction between government officials and
legislators at the deliberation meetings discussing migration legislation, the Gazette also
renders insights to the attitudes and mentality of political actors that reflect the overall social
discourses surrounding migrant spouses. Second, in-depth interviews with MATSC board
members and observations of its closed-door activities and public events between November
2010 and October 2011 were utilized so as to understand the operation of the organization.
Finally, this chapter also benefits from more recent interviews with an academic activist and
a number of KMT politicians conducted in May and July 2013. 
The following section will examine the socio-political environment that shaped the actions of
AHRLIM, as well as those of MATSC. Under the shared but different forms of
discrimination, AHRLIM and MATSC developed different strategies of collective
negotiation within the socio-political environment. Before the formation of AHRLIM, South
East Asian spouses were mainly represented by TASAT, whereas PRC spouses were largely
represented by MATSC. The different process and mobilization strategies of TASAT and
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MATSC are crucial to understand the divergent interests housed within AHRLIM. 
MATSC: a hard-earned recognition 
The years under the DPP presidency corresponded to a rising rate of marriage migration, in
particular migration from the PRC (MoI 2013). Migrant spouses from South East Asia and
China found themselves in a discriminatory and exclusionary social-political environment,
yet they were imposed on by different patterns of discrimination (Chen and Yu 2005; Tsai
2011). Despite the celebratory publicity of embracing multicultural values, the DPP
government inaugurated the requirement of Chinese language proficiency for citizenship
eligibility for South East Asian spouses, who were regarded as inferior ethnic others and
incapable mothers (Cheng I. 2013; Cheng and Fell 2014). Their questioned motherhood,
symbolized by their inability to use the Chinese language, was seen as deteriorating the
quality of the host nation and, as such, was considered to be a threat (NSC 2006: 61; Hsia
2007a). In contrast, PRC marriage migrants are particularly politicized. They were seen as an
‘enemy within’, owing to the concern of their indoctrination of communist values, which are
alien to the way of life of Taiwan (Cheng 2014). As their political loyalty was questioned,
they, as a political force, were feared for their potential to compromise Taiwan’s de facto
independence vis-à-vis China (Lu 2008: 171; Yang and Lee 2009: 75). 
In this hostile socio-political environment, both communities were confronted by restrictive
legislation adopted by the DPP government intending to slow down the approval of their
citizenship applications. For all migrant spouses, an entry clearance interview was introduced
in 2003 in order to deter human trafficking under the disguise of marriage. However, South
East Asian spouses and PRC spouses are regulated by different laws for their citizenship
eligibility. The former are under the Immigration Act and Nationality Act, whereas the latter
are under the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan and the Mainland
Area (henceforth the Cross-Strait Act) (Cheng and Fell 2014: 17–21). In the past, South East
Asian spouses faced a high financial requirement for citizenship eligibility and they lost the
right to reside after the cessation of their marriage. As for migrants from the PRC, they were
entirely dependent on their Taiwanese spouses’ sponsorship for their residency. There was a
limitation on their right to own property, they could not work until after six-year residency
and their incomes were heavily taxed. The defining difference of the legal treatment between
the two categories is the required length of residency for citizenship eligibility. For foreign
spouses, it was no less than four years, in addition to the renunciation of their original
nationality. For PRC spouses, it was no less than eight years, after the DPP government failed
to prolong it to 11 years in 2002–03 (Tseng et al. 2013). Furthermore, they were denied the
right to assemble and to found or join social organizations (Tseng et al. 2013; Chao 2006).
Before 2008, the restrictions on South East Asian spouses were the top priority on the reform
agenda of migrant movement (Hsia 2009b: 371; Liao 2009: 398).
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The different treatments as outlined above highlight the fact that PRC and South East Asian
spouses were situated in a similar as well as different socio-political environment. As a wife-
mother, both were seen as inferior ethnic others and a threat to the host nation. On the other
hand, the hostility towards the migrants from the PRC and from South East Asian countries
was differently constituted. PRC migrants were politicized by the antagonism across the
Taiwan Strait and the anxiety of protecting Taiwan’s challenged sovereignty, whereas the
South East Asians were pathologized as having the potential for the deterioration of Taiwan’s
prosperity. The shared experiences of encountering hostility paved a common ground for
their collaboration within AHRLIM. Yet, the different substance of the hostility foretold their
distinctive interests and strategies. 
From the mid-1990s, various migrant spouse organizations started to emerge in civil society.
Facing the DPP’s conservative attitude towards social movements (Ho 2005: 411–13), these
dispersed organizations formed AHRLIM, an inclusive organization flexible enough to house
various organizations focusing on migrants’ well-being. It was during the first DPP
presidency that confrontation at a national level between the government and the alliance
kicked off. Founded by Taiwanese activists in the name of the migrant community for
pursuing the reform of immigration legislation, AHRLIM proved to have a stronger impact
than individual organizations and amplified the empathy of a still relatively fragmented civil
society for the well-being of labour and marriage migrants in Taiwan. Thus, it is argued that
the founding of AHRLIM symbolized the burgeoning of the migrant movement in Taiwan
(Hsia 2008: 194). 
Yet, long before AHRLIM was conceived, MATSC had already established its presence in
the civil society of Taiwan, since December 1998 when social movements had gradually
become a ‘permanent, routine and legitimate feature’ in the newly democratized society of
Taiwan (Chang 2004; Ho 2010: 10). Unlike their South East Asian counterparts, who faced a
language barrier and, as a result, who relied on local activists’ anchoring in the rights-claim
movement, MATSC’s campaign was relatively autonomous and independent of guidance
from influential academics. However, a peculiarity of MATSC is that the organization was
nominally founded by Taiwanese spouses and families because, as explained above, of the
legal deprivation of the right of PRC marriage migrants to form or join social organizations. 
The cooperation between husbands and wives in creating and developing their campaign is a
defining characteristic distinguishing MATSC from other organizations within AHRLIM.
This spousal cooperation contributed to its distinctive strategies and values, which were
different from those of TASAT, an advocacy organization for South East Asian spouses. First
of all, the spousal cooperation of MATSC highlighted its endogenous agency as the
organization was not set up by Taiwanese activists. Both Chinese and Taiwanese spouses
held the ownership of their social campaign and directly participated in the negotiation with
the state. PRC spouses particularly regarded themselves as insiders of the host society, given
the perceived cultural proximity between Taiwan and China. In contrast, TASAT was
founded by Taiwanese activists in the name of
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South East Asian migrants, whose foreign cultural inheritance singled them out as the other
in the Taiwanese society. AHRLIM, having its roots in TASAT, holds similar principles.
Thus, the empowerment of migrant spouses was assisted by the advocacy of Taiwanese
activists. Second, the spousal cooperation within MATSC meant that the blame on patriarchy
as the root cause of the issues of marriage migration was spared by MATSC’s campaign
publicity. After all, the spousal working partnership was critical to the operation of its social
campaign. In contrast, TASAT’s stance was informed by a feminist critique on patriarchy.
The critique argues that the difficulties encountered by migrant spouses in their daily life is
rooted in marriage itself, the unequal power relations between wife and husband within the
family and the consequential legislation that reinforces the unequal power relations. Thus,
some academic activists called for ‘liberat[ing] immigrant women from marriages’ (Cheng
S.-y. 2013: 17), an appeal that never featured in MATSC’s campaign publicity. Instead of
blaming marriage, MATSC pointed their criticism at the state, whose discriminatory
legislation has impacts on both husbands and wives. As the President of MATSC, a
Taiwanese husband, explained, ‘If your wife is discriminated, you are also discriminated’
(interview, 28 July 2011, Taipei). Third, the spousal cooperation also fed into MATSC’s
issue-framing strategy, which characterized their petition as one for maintaining an
undisrupted family life for husbands and wives and parents and children, rather than for
migrant spouses only (Tseng et al. 2013: 209). With this essential difference explained, the
next section will analyse AHRLIM’s strategies prior to 2008, which prioritized the interests
of South East Asian marriage migrants over those of PRC migrants. 
Before 2008: pale in the background 
After the DPP assumed power in 2000, human rights became a key element of the party’s
construction of Taiwan’s self-identity. This construction was epitomized by the slogan of
‘Nationhood of Human Rights’ and the establishment of the National Human Rights
Commission. This self-identity was given a boost after Taiwan ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights and voluntarily made them applicable in the domestic laws. 
Thus, when the DPP was in power, human right discourses proved a useful resource for
framing the issue of migrant rights and mobilizing political support from legislators. As a
matter of fact, before the discourse of human rights earned wide political currency in the
2000s, framing the rights of migrant spouses as universal human rights was already
commonly employed as a campaign strategy. Not only was it those foreign spouses who
petitioned legislators who evoked this concept (LY 1998a: 303), but KMT and DPP
legislators also appealed to human rights when sponsoring initiatives changing legislation.
They sometimes cited relevant international law-making so as to enhance the credibility of
their appeal (LY 1998b: 828, 843; LY 1999: 414). As shown in the deliberation of the draft
bill of the Immigration Act in 1998 and 1999, the passing of the law itself was
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taken by legislators as a signifier of how the Taiwanese state treated foreign nationals and
how it would implement constitutionally protected human rights. The promulgation and
implementation were further considered in relation to whether Taiwan could be seen as being
civilized, progressive, democratic and under the rule of law (LY 1998a: 297; LY 1998b: 828;
LY 1999: 229). These records illuminate that, in addition to being a human rights issue, the
legal treatment for immigrants was also conceptualized as that of reinforcing self-identity and
the grooming of self-image, a reoccurring theme that the movement utilized in their campaign
in the last decade (LY 2005: 121–4). 
Thus, similarly to the strategies undertaken by other social movements in the second half of
the 1990s (Ho 2010), in 2005 AHRLIM lobbied for support within the Legislative Yuan and
obtained bipartisan endorsement of 60 legislators for their bill amending the Immigration
Act. AHRLIM’s amendment bill was guided by the synergy between activism and
professionalism. That is, inside the alliance, legal experts’ professionalism was directed by
first-hand knowledge of real cases and identification of potential problems provided by grass-
roots organizations (Liao 2009: 401–3). Externally, staging public protests, organizing public
consultation meetings and hosting press conferences were the most effective means to raise
public awareness and showcasing the agency of the movement (Hsia 2006b: 22–3). Its
campaign included the mobilization of large-scale protests resisting the financial requirement
for PRC migrants’ citizenship eligibility in March 2004, denouncing the vice education
minister’s comment on the alleged high fertility of immigrant spouses in July 2004,
criticizing the Naturalisation Test in July 2005 and opposing the high threshold for foreign
spouses’ financial sufficiency in September 2007 (Hsia 2006b: 31–2, 2009b: 371). 
The DPP’s authorship of the human rights discourse seemed hypocritical given that the party
was taken accountable for promulgating and implementing hostile legislation towards
migrant spouses. Thus, appealing to self-identity and highlighting the gap between rhetoric
and reality became AHRLIM’s effective strategy to lobby the support of DPP and TSU
legislators (Hsia 2013: 142–6). A largely unnoticed external input that strengthened the
opportunity to build on the human rights discourse was the pressure from the US government.
In 2003, Taiwan was accused by the US government of turning a blind eye to marriage
migration being abused by smugglers for sex and labour exploitation. Taiwan’s claim to
champion human rights protection was at stake, and the state, as well as the people of
Taiwan, was taken to be accountable for the violation of human rights of migrant spouses.
The sense of urgency of addressing the US criticism was shared by the executive and
legislative branches across the board. Thus, the external US pressure opened a new window
of opportunity for the movement to win bipartisan support for amending the legislation
(Cheng and Momesso, forthcoming). 
Similar to the overlooked US pressure, there is no attention paid to the contribution of
transnational and regional networks to the enhancement of the advocacy of the movement.
The Asian Pacific Mission for Migrants (APMM) and the Action Network for Marriage
Migrants’ Rights and Empowerment (AMM♀RE)
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(of which TASAT is a member) offered the indigenous movement opportunities of exchange,
discussion and connection across borders. APMM is now included as one of AHRLIM’s
group members, together with the Migrant International-Taiwan Chapter. The flow of
information from APMM and AMM♀RE with regard to national policies, migrants’ living
conditions and related actions provided significant insights to practitioners and activists in
Taiwan, who built on these examples and developed their own agenda and strategies (Cheng
and Momesso, forthcoming). 
Since 2003, AHRLIM has attempted to bridge the gap between PRC spouses and South East
Asian spouses by emphasizing the shared interests and suggesting how the two groups could
benefit from each other’s support. According to an academic activist who was deeply
involved in the movement, the fact that PRC spouses do not have a language barrier and had
experiences in organizing collective actions could prove useful for South East Asian spouses
who were inexperienced in this regard. However, considering the complexity of citizenship
legislation and avoiding to be overstretched by fighting on two fronts, AHRLIM prioritized
the reform of the Immigration Act and Nationality Act and set aside the reform of the Cross-
Strait Act as a later task (interviews, 9 June 2011 and 15 July 2013, Taipei). AHRLIM’s
success in reforming the two laws constituted a precedent with which to push for the reform
of the Cross-Strait Act (Hsia 2009b: 379). In other words, although MATSC was one of the
founding members of AHRLIM since 2003, only in the last years of the DPP government
could MATSC reap the benefit of its membership of this alliance. This lower priority
suggests that during the DPP era, in spite of AHRLIM’s activism, MATSC did not feature
significantly in AHRLIM’s campaign. The prioritization and the division of labour were not
advantageous for MATSC to further its pursuits. 
On top of the internal disadvantage, the external socio-political environment was not
beneficial for MATSC either. Although the human rights discourses seemed useful for
framing the issue for South East Asian spouses, when it was applied to the Chinese, its
universality failed to cross the rigidity of identity politics. Instead, hyped nationalistic
sentiments during the DPP’s first presidency proved obstructive for MATSC. As mentioned
above, with the collaboration of the TSU legislators, the DPP government attempted to
prolong the qualifying residency for citizenship eligibility of PRC spouses to 11 years. This
motion was tabled in overwhelming nationalistic sentiments which liberally accused PRC
spouses of being disloyal to Taiwan (Tseng et al. 2013: 215). Thus, while under the DPP
most social movements gained access to participate in the decision-making process of the
state and obtained official recognition as the legitimate representatives of their constituencies
(Ho 2010: 408–11), the channels to gain face-to-face negotiation with the government were
denied to MATSC. This was largely because the DPP government saw their actions as
interference with the domestic politics of Taiwan and a transgression of the permitted
purpose of their entry to Taiwan (Tseng et al. 2013: 214). Related to the volatile nationalistic
sentiments were Taiwan–China relations, which also confined the advancement of the
collective actions of PRC spouses. As pointed out by a KMT legislator, 
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the support of the blue camp for PRC spouses was externally checked by Taiwan–China
relations. When the relationship went sour, none of the pan-blue parties could afford to
sanction an all-out campaign for helping PRC migrants (interview, 10 July 2013, Taipei). 
Thus, while AHRLIM was making its demands heard by the state and society, MATSC found
itself entrapped in a hostile environment during the DPP era. The political opportunity
created by the human rights discourse was unavailable to them. Moreover, their
communication with the general public was impaired by the fanfare of the nationalistic
discourse. Their non-confrontational actions, such as petitioning at government officials
(often used during the KMT era) and seeking legislators’ support, had not yielded any fruit. A
MATSC board member recalled that, at that point, the organization had realized that they had
no other options but resorting to more assertive and confrontational actions so as to pile
pressure on the DPP government (interview, 8 October 2011, Taipei). In other words,
MATSC found itself contemplating a more effective mobilizing structure whereby their
issue-framing strategy could be utilized. Assisted by the Taiwan New Immigrants Labour
Rights Organization (臺灣新移民勞動權益促進會) in terms of knowledge and resources, in
November 2002 MATSC organized a large-scale protest in front of the Legislative Yuan
against the proposed prolongation of the required residency for citizenship eligibility and
asked for the recognition of PRC university degrees. The fact that the protest was joined by
migrant mothers and their children drove home the message that marriage migration was a
matter of family well-being rather than the one of bogus marriages for illegal employment or
prostitution, as postulated by the DPP government. The escalated confrontation between
MATSC and the DPP government reached a peak in 2003, when PRC spouses who joined
demonstrations were threatened with expulsion (Tseng et al. 2013: 214). In September,
nearly 3,000 PRC migrants and their supporters marched through Taipei and protested
against the DPP’s initiative of extending the required residency from eight to 11 years. As it
turned out, this initiative was blocked in the Legislative Yuan in 2003. In the DPP’s later
years, before it was succeeded by the KMT in 2008, other improvements were put in place,
such as granting the right to work, recognizing PRC university degrees and granting the right
to reside in Taiwan in cases of the death of Taiwanese spouses. As a consequence of these
successful actions, MATSC, as an advocacy organization, became more visible and assertive
and it won the trust, among organizations advocating the well-being of PRC spouses, as their
major representative (Tseng et al. 2013: 215). 
After 2008: winning recognition 
The KMT presidency after 2008 was marked as a dim period for social movements to the
extent that whether social movements were able to continue was questioned (Ho 2010: 16).
Nevertheless, for the migrant movement, and in particular for MATSC, the opposite was true.
As a matter of fact, MATSC saw new opportunities opening up after the KMT returned to
power. The new political
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environment was underlined by the KMT’s growing interest in safeguarding the votes of PRC
spouses, as mentioned by a KMT legislator who was involved in the migrant movement
(interview, 15 July 2013, Taipei). According to the above-cited academic activist, the
ultimate source of such support came from the president himself, who, during the election
campaign, made the equalization of legal treatment between PRC and South East Asian
spouses a personal commitment. It was not only a presidential promise, but also in the
interests of some KMT legislators. For instance, the above-cited KMT legislator explained
that supporting Chinese spouses for legal reform in the Legislative Yuan was in tandem with
winning their votes in the constituency. Given that his constituency was home to a large
number of PRC spouses and their mainlander veteran husbands, he had to prevent candidates
of the People First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP) from eroding his support base among
mainlander (waishengren) voters. This was because the other two parties had a free hand to
advocate even more favourable treatment for marriage migrants from the PRC when the
KMT was inclined for a slower change to the legislation. This competition was fiercer under
the single non-transferable vote in the multi-member district system (SNTV-MMD), as small
parties with an extreme policy stood a good chance of winning seats (see Göbel 2012 for a
discussion of the impact of the change in voting system). Yet, once the SNTV-MMD system
was replaced by a majority system, the threat from small parties was abated (interview, 10
July 2013). 
In such favourable environment, face-to-face negotiation between MATSC and the
government was made possible. Members of MATSC noticed that their interactions with
government officials improved significantly and more intensive interactions in turn led to a
stronger support of government officials. As there was a more constructive attitude towards
each other, public confrontation was spared and replaced by closed-door meetings either at
the governmental premises or in MATSC office. For instance, in 2011, ahead of the general
election of 2012, MATSC organized a couple of rallies calling on the two main parties to
respond to the appeals of PRC spouses. The DPP did not respond to their call. In contrast, as
a member of the MATSC board revealed, the KMT government received the protesters in a
closed-door meeting with the vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), where a
promise of equalizing the qualifying length of residency for citizenship eligibility was made
(interview, 8 October 2011, Taipei). Also, later on, exchanges of views on the phone and
mutual visits between MATSC and the state apparatus (including personnel of the MAC and
the National Immigration Agency) became normal practice. At long last, MATSC, along with
the Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Service (CARES) ( 中 華 救 助 總 會), an
organization providing services to PRC spouses, became one of the major communication
channels between the state and PRC spouses. In this new political atmosphere, MATSC
committed itself to coming to the aid of PRC spouses. It regarded AHRLIM’s expertise in
law-making and its previous success in pushing reform as a ‘yardstick’ to reform the Cross-
Strait Act. The above-mentioned activist explained that their collaboration on the draft bill of
amending the Cross-Strait Act drew from the legal expertise of AHRLIM
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and the grass-roots feedback of MATSC, which was gained from its rich experiences of a 10-
year campaign (interview, 9 June 2011, Taipei). The collaboration notwithstanding, joint
actions between the two remained limited after 2009. One MATSC board member attributed
the lack of deeper and continuing cooperation to their divergent interests derived from the
dual legal track system (interview, 2 March 2011, Taipei). AHRLIM continued to appeal to
the human rights discourses and mobilize legislators’ support for its campaign on reforming
the Nationality Act. In April 2013, AHRLIM presented its draft bill to the Legislative Yuan
and its goals were the legal acceptance of dual nationality, granting migrant spouses the right
to serve public office with immediate effect after acquiring citizenship, and applying the
regulations for foreign spouses’ naturalization to foreign widows or divorcees (AHRLIM
2013; Cheng S.-Y. 2013). 
As a result of AHRLIM and MATSC’s campaigns, the long-awaited reform of the Cross-
Strait Act was finally achieved in August 2009. The marriage brokering industry was
outlawed. For both PRC and foreign spouses, the financial requirement was dropped. For
PRC spouses, the right to reside after the cessation of marriage was granted, but for foreign
spouses this was premised on their gaining the custody of their children. As for PRC spouses,
they were permitted to work as soon as they entered Taiwan, a right that had already been
granted to their South East Asian counterparts by the previous DPP government. The most
fought for reform – equalizing the qualifying period of residency for PRC and foreign
spouses – was not realized, however. It was not until November 2012 that the appeal for
equalization was finally accepted by the KMT government, who included this amendment in
the draft bill to be passed by the Legislative Yuan (Cheng and Fell 2014: 91). Yet, as of
January 2016, marriage migrants from the PRC are still required to reach six years of
residency before they become eligible for citizenship (Tseng et al. 2013). Thus, the
president’s commitment notwithstanding, inside the government an agreement on the
equalization was hard to reach. 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed that the migrant movement in Taiwan has not been the result of a linear
process, nor can it be interpreted solely as a united and concerted effort for all migrants.
Centred on the differentiated rights of PRC and South East Asian spouses derived from the
dual legal track, this chapter compared the development of AHRLIM, as an umbrella alliance,
and MATSC, as a component organization within the alliance, so as to highlight the internal
heterogeneity of the migrant movement in Taiwan as well as its distinctive opportunities and
constraints derived from the change in the ruling party. 
The parallel existence of, and loose working relationship between AHRLIM and MATSC
manifested in different histories, development paths and outcomes of the members within the
movement. Self-regarded as insiders within the Taiwanese society, PRC spouses, with the
indispensable help of their Taiwanese partners, were able to exercise their agency against the
unfavourable structures
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embodied by the nationalistic politics and the national security discourse. In contrast, being
the other in the Taiwanese society, the empowerment of South East Asian spouses was
assisted by the guardianship of local activists. By exploring this difference, this chapter drew
a dynamic picture closer to the reality rather than adding on the empathy and universal
sisterhood celebrated by established literature. Our findings underlined that heterogeneity
within the movement is the strength as well as the weakness of the campaign. 
Bringing together both outside-in and inside-out perspectives, this chapter identified two
fundamental parameters of the evolution of migrant movement. An outside-in perspective
was beneficial to trace how the migrant movement continuously reconfigured its agenda
according to the changed political opportunities and the divergent interests of its member
organizations. In this regard, this chapter highlighted previously unnoticed external
influences during the DPP era from the US, as well as transnational and regional networks.
As a whole, these factors contributed to framing the movement into the human rights
discourse, enhancing support from the legislative and executive branches and mobilizing
transnational and regional resources. After 2008, the KMT government held a more
accommodative attitude towards spouses from the PRC and subsequently developed a closer
working relationship with MATSC. Consequently, the broader alliance adjusted to these
changed political opportunities. 
An inside-out perspective was essential to look at the internal divide as a consequence to the
unequal legal status between PRC spouses and their South East Asian counterparts. The
mutual constitution of the two parameters was evident in how AHRLIM and MATSC set
their agendas in accordance with the availability of political opportunities before and after
2008. Thus, a dynamics of change and continuity was depicted in the sense that the migrant
movement constantly adjusted its strategy while its internal divide remained. The utility of an
inside-out perspective is also found in illuminating the divide within the movement. Although
AHRLIM attempted to bridge the differences between various migrant groups, its
prioritization nevertheless reinforced this division. Under the DPP administration, being
denied by the chance of tapping into the resources derived from the human rights discourses,
MATSC was set aside as a second priority within AHRLIM. As a result, it was left with no
options but undertaking more confrontational presentation of their views to the government
and the general public. After 2008, while AHRLIM worked closely to reform the Cross-Strait
Act, MATSC continued its campaign on a relatively independent basis even when the KMT
was in power. 
To conclude, our analysis showed that political opportunities did make a difference to how
the migrant movement adjusted its strategies so as to advance its causes. Yet, along with
political opportunity, mobilizing structure and the framing process, the impact of the internal
heterogeneity cannot be overlooked so as to fully understand the development of the rights-
claim movement of migrant spouses.
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Note 
1 In addition to TASAT and MATSC, the other group founding members were the
Awakening Foundation ( 婦 女 新 知), the Association for the Development and Care of
Foreign Spouses (外籍配偶成長 關懷協會), the Taiwan International Family Association (台
灣 國 際 家 庭 互 助 協 會), the Taiwan Migrants’ Forum ( 台 灣 外 勞 行 動), the New
Immigrants Labour Rights Association ( 新移 民 勞動 權益 促 進 會), the Female Labour
Rights Association (女性勞動者權益促進會), the Labour Rights Association (勞動人權協
會), the Taiwan Association for Human Rights (台灣人權促進會), the Rerum Novarum
Center (新事勞工服務中 心) and a few other organizations (Hsia 2009b: 369; Hsia 2007b).
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